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Proximity, pain and State punishment 
David Hayes, The University of Sheffield, UK* 
Abstract 
This article examines the difficulties of calculating the severity of sentences 
presented by differences in LQGLYLGXDOSHQDOVXEMHFWV¶ experiences, a key challenge 
to proportionality-based justifications of punishment. It explores the basic 
arguments for and against recognising subjective experience, before advancing a 
model of penal severity based upon the proximity of the pains of punishment to 
penal State actions. This model could partially resolve foundational problems in 
giving criminally just sentences. Whilst we cannot wholly reconcile penal 
subjectivism and objectivism, there are still some opportunities to improve penal 
policy and sentencing practice by adopting a proximity model for penal severity. 
Keywords 
Measurement; Pains of Punishment; Penal Policy; Penal Severity; Sentencing. 
Introduction 
A considerable literature shows that both custodial and non-custodial sanctions are 
routinely accompanied by the experience of suffering, arising out of both the penal 
6WDWH¶V RZQ LQWHUYHQWLRQV DQG WKH ZLGHU DFWLYLW\ RI QRQ-penal-State actors (e.g. 
Sykes, 1958; Payne and Gainey, 1998; Crewe, 2011; Durnescu, 2011; Sexton, 
2015). ThH H[LVWHQFH RI WKHVH µSDLQVRISXQLVKPHQW¶ raises the question: to what 
extent, if at all, should that pain be considered part of the punishment inflicted, for 
the purposes of calculating the severity of a sentence? This issue has produced 
extended debates between penal subjectivists, who calculate severity in terms of 
the pains experienced by the penal subject (e.g. Bronsteen et al., 2009, 2010; 
Kolber, 2009a, 2009b); and objectivists, who focus on what deprivations were 
intended by the sentencing authority  (e.g. Markel and Flanders, 2010; Gray, 2010; 
Markel et al., 2011; Haque, 2013: 79-80). 
 This debate has so far been conducted in rather binary terms: one is either 
wholly objectivist or subjectivist about the question of what constitutes punishment. 
This article subjects that binary to critical attention, and proposes a limited 
synthesis based upon the proximity of the pains of punishment to the intentional 
acts of sentencing authorities that would encourage a closer correspondence 
between criminal justice and social reality. Although this paper is situated in the 
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sentencing practice of England and Wales, the model it proposes is abstract, and 
could be adapted to other jurisdictions.  
 The article begins by exploring the fundamental challenges facing attempts 
at just sentencing for both penal objectivists and subjectivists. It then lays out the 
µSUR[LPLW\¶ model in detail. Lastly, it considers the implications of this model for 
both sentencing practice and penal policy. 
Sentencing, delimitation and difference 
The orthodox definition of punishment 
Subjectivist and objectivist measurements of punishment tend to take subtly 
different approaches to the task of defining what µpunishment¶ consists of. 
However, they start from more or less tKH VDPH SRLQW WKH µ)OHZ-Benn-+DUW¶
account, developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. On this account, criminal 
punishment has five characteristics. It is: (a) unpleasant; (b) imposed for conduct 
that has breached legal rules; (c) targeted against the individual responsible for 
that conduct; (d) imposed intentionally by State agents other than the subject; who 
are (e) acting under the authority of the breached law (McPherson, 1967; Flew, 
1954; Benn, 1958; Hart, 1960; compare Feinberg, 1970; Walker, 1991). 
 From the perspective of measuring how much punishment a particular 
sentence involves, these five characteristics are seemingly in tension: element (a), 
unpleasantness, implies that severity is calculated according to how unpleasant the 
subject¶Vactual experience of punishment is; whilst for element (d), intentionality, 
what matters is how much unpleasantness the State¶V agents objectively intend. As 
a result, element (a) is sometimes given as an objectivising compromise, µQRUPDOO\
considered unpleasant¶ (compare Walker, 1991: 1-3). Rather than relying on 
individual experiences, the accepted severity of the punishment is calculated in 
terms of how unpleasant something would usually be, determined by sentencing 
authorities¶ H[SHULHQFHV and by the distant perspectives of penal policy-makers 
(Haque, 2013: 79-80; Markel and Flanders, 2010). 
 Ultimately, this definition has proven popular amongst penal theorists and 
policy-makers alike (e.g. Duff, 2001; Markel, 2001). It is especially hegemonic at 
the level of sentencing, where decisions as to penal severity must necessarily be 
made with imperfect knowledge about the penal subject¶V past and future context 
(although note Ashworth, 2015: 192-197). Whilst the pains of punishment may not 
be completely irrelevant to the calculation of penal severity, in other words, 
accepted wisdom posits that we can only do so much to take penal subjectV¶
circumstances and likely experiences into account at the point of sentence. 
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Penal objectivism: The challenge of difference 
However, a central problem with this objective approach is that it obscures 
significant variation in the impact of criminal punishment upon different subjects. 
7KLV µFKDOOHQJH RI GLIIHUHQFHV LQ LPSDFW¶ (Ryberg, 2010: 74-82) represents a 
particularly entrenched difficulty for the measurement of penal severity (e.g. 
Beccaria, 1764), especially given the difficulty of achieving µMXVWGHVHUWVLQDQXQMXVW
ZRUOG¶ (Tonry, 2014: 141; compare Hudson, 1987, 2000). Individuals can be 
affected very differently by seemingly equal treatment, as a result of their 
expectations, prior experiences, and social context. The failure to account for these 
differences ultimately results in the entrenchment of differentiated treatment at 
every stage of the criminal justice process, which tends to magnify the impact of 
social injustices, such as poverty and racial inequalities, through criminal justice 
interventions (e.g. Hudson, 1987: 93-129; Wacquant, 2009).  
 This is a problem of under-definition of ZKDW µFRXQWV¶ DV SXQLVKPHQW %\
focussing entirely upon what the State wants to do, rather than what it does, we 
implicitly IRFXV WKH 6WDWH¶V QRUPDWLYH REOLJDWLRQ WR MXVWLI\ LWV µSDLQ GHOLYHU\¶
(Christie, 1982) on the aims of State actors, rather than on the consequences for 
individuals and for society. By measuring punishment only in terms of abstract 
deprivations of liberty, we reify it (and its imperfections) as an inevitable and 
unquestionable aspect of our society, to be mediated by other social policy 
interventions, if at all. But that is not to escape the authoritarian and coercive 
nature of State punishment. It is only to hide it behind a screen of reassuring 
euphemism (Christie, 1982: 13-19; Hudson, 1987: 167; Tonry, 2014: 164-165). 
 More to the point, the purely objective account of punishment is 
descriptively unsatisfying in an era when social research is making the lived 
experience of social phenomena ever-more accessible. It is increasingly possible to 
perceive the impacts of punishment as a subjectively experienced reality as well as 
a political-philosophical transaction: to supplement the austere, abstract account of 
µODZ RQWKHERRNV¶DFFRXQWZLWKILQH detail about punishment as µsomething that is 
done to people and experienced by SHRSOH¶ (Sexton, 2015: 115, original emphasis). 
If penal objectivism was necessary because of the challenges of taking subjective 
difference into account at the point of sentence, then advances that social research 
has made LQWKHKDOIFHQWXU\VLQFHWKHµ+DUW-Benn-)OHZ¶GHILQLWLRQ in detailing those 
differences are relevant to the debate. A modern penologist still could not 
accurately predict the future experience of a penal subject, but she could at least 
contribute to recognising patterns in past empirical experiences to a greater extent. 
The epistemological objection to subjectivised measurements of penal severity 
cannot be ignored, but it is overblown in the modern era.  
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Penal subjectivism: The challenge of delimitation 
There are, in short, compelling epistemic and ethical reasons to move away from a 
purely objective approach to measuring penal severity. However, a fully subjective 
measurement of sentence severity would also be subject to serious weaknesses. 
For one, even if social research has made subjective experiences of punishment 
more accessible to penal decision-makers, the challenges of accurately and 
consistently predicting future experiences of punishment remain. Even if 
subjectivised punishment is an ideal situation, the complexities of human life make 
perfect predictions unrealistic, compelling judges to either monitor penal subjects 
constantly for signs of over- or under-punishment (compare Markel and Flanders, 
2010: 982-984), or else to accept that unpredictable factors cause potentially 
UDGLFDOLQHTXDOLWLHVLQSHQDOVXEMHFWV¶experiences of punishment. Neither possibility 
would be solve WKHµFKDOOHQJHRIGLIIHUHQFHVLQLPSDFW¶GLVFXVVHGDERYH 
 Moreover, subjectivists would also fall foul of Ryberg¶V (2010: 82-87) 
µFKDOOHQJHRIGHOLPLWDWLRQ¶7Kis is, essentially, a problem of over-definition: if the 
only criterion for what counts as punishment is the subject¶V H[SHULHQFH RI
unpleasantness, then it becomes practically impossible to separate unpleasantness 
that is the result of the intrusion of the penal State from unpleasantness that is 
otherwise extant in the subject¶V SRVW-conviction life. As a result, accounts of 
subjective penal experiences tend to provide catalogues of hardship, and to offer 
little, if any basis for comparing the relative severity of particular sentences. That 
is, they tell us that punishment is unpleasant, and in what ways, but not how 
unpleasant, and as a result of which specific causes. However, to accurately 
measure penal severity, which is a prerequisite of ensuring equality before penal 
law, we need precisely that capacity for distinguishing punitive pains from non-
punitive ones, in a way that allows for penal experiences to be meaningfully 
compared (Hayes, 2016). 
 This is one reason why the objectivising definition of punishment in terms of 
what is µQRUPDOO\ FRQVLGHUHG XQSOHDVDQW¶ KDV survived for so long. A purely 
subjective account is no better at achieving just sentencing than a purely objective 
one, and is considerably harder to operationalise. Any account of subjectivity is 
relegated to the formulation of penal policy, which necessarily deals with macro-
social issues in the abstract, rather than (directly) confronting the lived experience 
of individuals.  
 However, this prevents sentencing authorities from dealing with the painful 
contexts in which they sentence, and to a certain extent excuses them of ethical 
responsibility for imposing them. Epistemologically and ethically, we can do better 
WKDQ³QRUPDOO\FRQVLGHUHGXQSOHDVDQW´. This article provides an overview of a model 
attempting to do so, framing penal severity so as to emphasise subjective 
experience, whilst still allowing clarity about what punishments consists of. 
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Modelling the proximity of the pains of punishment to the penal State 
The model I propose conceptualises punishment in terms of pain, and categorises 
those pains in terms of their proximity to the (penal) State. I should therefore start 
by defining these two key concepts. 
Pain 
7KH µSDLQV RI SXQLVKPHQW¶ DUH D ZHOO-established subject of penological research, 
although it is only in the last few decades that a full range of custodial and non-
custodial sentences has been considered in light of them (e.g. Sykes, 1958: 64; 
Christie, 1982: 9-11; Payne and Gainey, 1998; Gainey and Payne, 2000; Crewe, 
2011; Durnescu, 2011; Hayes, 2015).  
 A pain of punishment can therefore be defined (at least for present 
purposes) as a personal experience of physical, mental, or emotional suffering by a 
penal subject, arising from their punishment by agents of a criminal justice system. 
7KDWFRQFHSWRI µDULVLQJIURP¶ZLOOQHHd to be addressed in the rest of this article, 
since it cuts to the heart of the subjectivist/objectivist divide. However, it is 
important to stress that this approach views punishment as intrinsically and 
subjectively unpleasant (compare Matravers, 2016), and something that is only 
ultimately defined by individual experience (however much that experience is 
structured by socio-demographic contexts such as gender, age, ethnicity, 
socioeconomic class, and sexual orientation). 0RUHRYHUWKHFRQFHSWRIµSDLQ¶needs 
to be understood as more than a neurological phenomenon ± it includes physical 
agony, mental trauma, and emotional angst (Christie, 1982: 9-11). However, it is 
possible to speak of pains varying over time, and to compare them against one 
another in general terms. The pains of punishment provide a research-intensive but 
richly detailed metric of SXQLVKPHQW¶VH[SHULHQFHGLPSDFW+D\HV 
 It is also important to stress the individuated nature of these pains, which 
may well exist alongside positive experiences and penal outcomes. A probationer, 
for example, may be happy to participate in unpaid work as part of her order, 
because she wishes to make reparations for her crime (I am grateful to my 
anonymous reviewers for this example). Like Raskolnikov, she is happy to suffer 
her punishment, and may even look to derive something positive from it. But that 
does not mean that she does not suffer (compare Duff, 2001: 116-125). Indeed, 
exploratory research suggests that those who are most engaged with community 
punishments are most likely to experience particular pains, particularly the shame 
of their offending and pains associated with rehabilitative processes themselves 
(Hayes, 2015: 90-94). Just because a sentence benefits the offender, it does not 
follow that it cannot also hurt them (McNeill, 2011). 
 One difficulty with using the pains of punishment is that the concept was not 
designed for consistent comparisons between subjects. Indeed, most studies to 
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date have provided purely subjectivist accounts: detailed overviews of the 
(harmful) lived experiences of SDUWLFXODUVXEMHFWV¶ punishments (e.g. Sykes, 1958: 
64; Christie, 1982: 9-11; Payne and Gainey, 1998; Crewe, 2011; Durnescu, 2011; 
Hayes, 2015). But these still leave us with the problem of delimitation. Pains can 
(and routinely do) arise out of (re)actions to conviction and punishment from 
community forces, friends, family, and other departments of State, for instance. 
Any use of the pains of punishment to measure penal severity must consider how 
much weight (if any) to give these factors in its calculus. This is where a 
consideration of proximity comes into play. 
Proximity 
Pain does not exist in a vacuum. Whatever form it might take, it is caused, 
exacerbated, and ameliorated by specific factors. The interplay of these factors 
enables the division of the pains of punishment into a taxonomy based upon the 
closeness of their relationship to the intentional actions of the penal State. 
Specifically, this model identifies four distinct classes (depicted graphically in Figure 
One, below): direct pains, which are straightforwardly intended by the State; 
oblique pains, which can be said to be indirectly intended by the State, by analogy 
with criminal law; contextual pains, which are unintended but still bear a causal 
connection to the severity of the penal intervention; and entirely unrelated pains 
that are only coincidentally extant in the subject¶VOLIHduring their punishment. 
Figure One. Model of the proximity of pains of punishment to the penal State 
 
Direct Pains: e.g. 
Liberty Deprivation 
Oblique Pains: e.g. 
Reduced Employability 
Contextual Pains: 
e.g. Impact on Family 
Relationships 
Unrelated Pains: e.g. 
Bereavement 
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 This distribution of pains enables us to revisit the question of which pains 
should be taken into account when determining the severity of sentences. We might 
take some or all of these groups of pains into account (with the exception of those 
which are wholly unrelated to punishment). Although this taxonomy still provides 
no immediate means of ranking pains of punishment against one another (compare 
µSHQDOLPSDFW¶LQ+D\HVLWGRHVHQDEOHXVWRLGHQWLI\FHUWDLQJURXSVRISDLQV
that are more or less clearly associated with the infliction of punishment, 
notwithstanding their lack of (penal State) intentionality. 
 Before discussing these categories in more detail, I should make two 
observations about the model. Firstly, Figure One is not (necessarily) to scale. One 
penal subject may suffer numerous contextual pains, for instance, and another 
virtually none. Secondly, there is no reason to assume that more direct pains 
necessarily contribute more to the severity of individual sentences. Indeed, several 
pains that are routinely highlighted as particularly severe by penal subjects, such as 
the interruption of family relationships, may be wholly contextual, whereas direct 
pains, such as liberty deprivation, may be comparatively less severe (Sexton, 2015: 
125-128; Hayes, 2015, 91-98).  
Overview of the proximity model 
Subject to those reservations, I now turn to the four categories of pains in more 
detail. Direct pains are relatively straightforward. They are those pains arising from 
explicitly intended penal State activities. The obvious examples of this sort of pain 
are those associated with the deprivation of liberty. When an authority sentences a 
penal subject to a particular punishment, they intend her to lose some of her 
freedoms of choice and self-direction, whether through incarceration, or the more 
partial restrictions of choice arising out of community penalties (Sykes, 1958: 65-
78; Durnescu, 2011: 534-536). These deprivations are explicit components of what 
the sentencing authority wants to happen to the penal subject, and so are easy to 
identify from either the sentence itself, or the fundamental nature of the modes of 
punishment it deploys (compare Duff, 2001: 143-155). 
 Unrelated pains are equally straightforward: they are unintended by the 
penal State (although they may be intended by other branches of government), 
and are neither caused nor exacerbated by the conviction and punishment of the 
penal subject. Thus they cannot be said to have any proximity to penal State 
actions at all. The example in Figure One is personal bereavement. Suppose I am 
sentenced to a community order, and thereafter a beloved relative suddenly and 
unexpectedly dies. One would expect this to hurt me profoundly, but that suffering 
could not reasonably be linked to the acts of the penal State. 
 However, it is very easy for initially unrelated pains to become affected by 
State punishment. Suppose that my relative was terminally ill, and my sentence 
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prevented me from visiting him in his final days. Here, the separation of the pains 
of my bereavement from my punishment becomes trickier. To what extent, if at all, 
should my personal loss now be considered as part of my SXQLVKPHQW¶VVHYHULW\"
The two remaining groups of pains, the oblique and the contextual, attempt to 
resolve some of these definitional issues. Let us discuss each in turn. 
Oblique intent and the penal State: An analogy with criminal law 
Oblique pains are a relatively narrow class of negative outcomes that the State can 
be said to indirectly intend. They enable compromise between pure penal 
objectivism and subjectivism, because they engage with empirical experiences, 
whilst remaining compatible with the orthodox (Flew-Benn-Hart) GHILQLWLRQ¶V 
µLQWHQWLRQDOLW\¶UHTXLUHPHQW. It does so via an analogy to the concept of µLQWHQWLRQ¶LQ
English criminal law. 
 Criminal lawyers have consistently struggled with tKHGHILQLWLRQRIµLQWHQWLRQ¶
has consistently confounded criminal lawyers, resulting in a relatively complex 
definition in the substantive law. To paraphrase the classic example (see generally 
Pedain, 2003): I ship cargo on a transatlantic flight, and secretly hide a bomb on 
board with the aim of destroying the cargo in order to claim on a lucrative 
insurance policy I have against it. I have no spHFLILFGHVLUHWRNLOOWKHFUDIW¶VFUHZ, 
and whilst I know they will be endangered, I hope that they survive. My only aim is 
the destruction of the cargo. However, when the bomb detonates, it destroys the 
aircraft, killing everyone on board. 
 While it is easy to say that I intend the destruction of the cargo when I 
detonate the bomb, it is harder to show that I µintend¶ the DHURSODQH¶V FUHZ¶V 
deaths. Nevertheless, the position of English law is that I may be taken to have 
intended those deaths, provided that I: (a) accurately foresee the consequence 
(the death of the crew) as a µvirtual certainty¶ of my actions; and (b) undertake 
those actions anyway (R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82). 
 It is important to recognise that the substantive law¶V Xse the concept of 
µintention¶ is slightly different to that of the orthodox definition of punishment. The 
substantive doctrine of oblique intent is a means of deciding whether the subject is 
culpable enough to be held criminally responsible. In the penal context, by contrast, 
we are asking whether the pains in question are sufficiently proximate to State 
DJHQWV¶ LQWHQWLRQV WRDOORZXV WR WDNH WKHP LQWRDFFRXQWZKHQGHWHUPLQLQJSHQDO
severity. But responsibility and severity of impact are not the same thing: the 
former does not affect the latter, especially if we accept that subjective experience 
is what constitutes penal severity. We must be cautious, therefore, about taking the 
legal test out of its conceptual and purposive context, despite the intuitive appeal of 
holding the State to the same standards to which it holds its citizens.  
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 Nevertheless, oblique State intent is a useful heuristic. It allows us to take 
some subjective experiences into account when calculating penal severity, without 
sacrificing our ability to meaningfully define punishment. Specifically, oblique intent 
contains two relatively narrow classes of pains: general and specific oblique pains. 
 General oblique pains are those which are virtually certain consequences of 
criminal conviction and punishment in all cases, but which are not directly intended 
by the sentencing judge. A good example would be the diminished employability 
that routinely accompanies a criminal conviction. Internationally, criminological 
research suggests that convicts will spend an average of two more years than non-
convicted job-seekers searching for employment, because of the stigma associated 
with the status of being an (ex-)offender (e.g. Graffam et al., 2008). In other 
words, all forms of criminal conviction carry an unintended, community-caused 
effect that is likely to occur (and cause at least some pain) in almost every case. 
 Accepting general obliquely intended pains into our analysis of penal 
severity should not mean that we must assume that every (jobless) convict will 
face exactly 24 months of additional job-seeking ahead of them. Some penal 
subjects will face longer or shorter periods of unemployment, and in any event, 
each individual will be pained by that unemployment in different ways, and to 
different extents (compare Kolber, 2009b: 1567-1568). The point is that some 
account can be made of it at sentence ± for instance, via a general reduction in the 
duration and onerousness of sentences by policy-makers, calculated with reference 
to research findings around the duration and effects of post-conviction joblessness.  
 This is not really subjectivism, in that it assumes consequences in an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V LQKHUHQWO\ XQSUHGLFWDEOH IXWXUH RQ WKH EDVLV RI SULRU FDVHV 5DWKHU
this category compromises between subjective and objective viewpoints. It allows 
us to alter our understanding of differences in (highly probable) impact over time, 
as the relationship between conviction and pain-causing factors changes. This 
would be difficult and research-intensive, undoubtedly, but by no means impossible. 
The more that phenomena such as reduced employability are explored (and made 
accessible to sentencing authorities) by social research, the easier it will be to 
accurately predict the duration and subjective impact of reduced employability in 
specific cases to a greater extent than is presently attempted.  
 By contrast, specific oblique pains are those which are virtually certain to 
arise in the particular case of the sentenced person. It is possible to interrogate the 
subject¶Vcircumstances much more directly here, using, for instance, pre-sentence 
reports, which are already a highly influential source of information for Anglo-Welsh 
sentencing authorities (Nash, 2011). 
 A good example of specific oblique pains would be those attending upon the 
ORVV RI RQH¶V KRPH DV D result of being imprisoned. These outcomes may be 
predictable from information available to the court ± for instance, where, under the 
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terms of the penal subject¶VKRXVLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV conviction results in automatic 
eviction. The sentencing authority can be virtually certain of the consequence, 
however much it may not desire it. By recognising the virtual certainty for that 
person, the possibility of recognising and accounting for the pains that this outcome 
is liable to cause opens up at the sentencing stage. Again, the enquiry into which 
pains connect to particular consequences of punishment in particular classes of 
RIIHQGHUV¶ FRQWH[WV FDQ EH H[SORUHG WKURXJK VRFLDO UHVHDUFK DQG LWV SRWHQWLDO WR
mitigate State punishments set within limits assigned by penal policy-makers. 
 Thus, oblique State intention allows us to account for a range of subjective 
factors that are relatively constrained, and which, although they tend to originate 
outside of the State, are sufficiently proximate to its decision-making that they can 
be analysed at the point of sentence. They provide an opportunity to substantially 
moderate the painfulness of penal State interventions, by better accounting for the 
different circumstances of particular subjects, whether as individuals or as classes. 
However, it should be recognised that the\ GR µREMHFWLYLVH¶ LQGLYLGXDO SDLQV WR DW
least some extent, making them only a partial tool for confronting the challenge 
posed by differences in impact to the accurate measurement of penal severity. 
Contextual pains and State responsibility: Beyond the analogy with criminal law 
Contextual pains, by contrast, consist of a much wider array of potential causes and 
effects. The example in Figure One is of the cluster of pains that potentially attend 
the interruption of family relationships by punishment. This might be relatively 
total, as with the loss of (direct) contact, outside of visitation, that attends 
imprisonment (e.g. Crewe, 2011: 511-512). But it might involve suffering arising 
out of more indirect interference with the freedom to spend time with parents, 
children, spouses, and other family members. Pains of separation, absence from 
key developmental moments or emotionally resonant events can be numerous, 
chimerical, and yet deeply significant in terms of their impact upon the penal 
sXEMHFW¶VOLIHSexton, 2015: 125; Hayes, 2015: 94-95). In other words, accounting 
for these pains would achieve a greater deal of fidelity to social reality when 
measuring penal severity, but doing so would require extremely fine detail on 
individual conviFWV¶SUHGLFWHGFLUFXPVWDQFHV 
 Whilst my analogy with oblique intent was constructed around pains that are 
(or could be) foreseen as virtually certain at the point of sentence, contextual pains 
are less predictable. They cover a wide variety of actions and reactions by groups 
formally unconnected to the penal State, including but not limited to: other public 
organisations, such as the welfare State and social services; charities and other 
third-sector organisations; private companies; community forces; friends and 
family; and indeed penal subjects themselves.  
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 Most significantly, however, these actors cannot influence the sentencing 
authority, in that they may not be foreseeable, let alone virtually certain, sources of 
pain at the point of sentence. However, unlike unrelated pains, contextual pains 
bear an indirect connection to the subject¶VFRQYLFWLRQDQGSXQLVKPHQW3DLQVWKDW
already existed in the penal subject¶VOLIHFRXOG be affected (positively or negatively) 
by the sentence, and new pains may be caused by the reactions of wider social 
actors to it. In both cases we can say that, whilst not necessarily foreseen or even 
foreseeable by sentencing authorities, these sources of pain are still proximate to 
the State in that pains are caused by penal intervention. 
 I use causation here in a broader sense than the substantive law. 
Essentially, the law first identifies a broad range of factors that the outcome could 
not have occurred without (R v White [1910] 2 KB 124), before narrowing down 
those factors to those which ought to render the relevant actor legally responsible 
(e.g. R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] UKHL 38, [2008] 1 AC 269; for an influential 
theorisation of this approach, see Hart and Honoré, 1985: 109-129). But again, we 
are not concerned here ZLWKWKH6WDWH¶Vresponsibility for the pains of punishment. 
Rather our focus is the impact that those pains have on thDWSXQLVKPHQW¶V severity. 
In other words, our field of enquiry is broader here than in the legal determination 
of guilt, and so a broader definition of causation is appropriate. 
 However, there is reason for caution when incorporating contextual pains 
into the measurement of penal severity. At its most extreme, this category could 
encompass virtually any suffering experienced over a period starting before, during 
or long after formal punishment is imposed. Moreover, since social experiences are 
rarely, if ever, the results of isolated causes, pains are likely to overlap in 
unpredictable ways. Where one subject might well distinguish between particular 
SDLQV µX hurts, and so does Y¶ another PD\ QRW µ, DP LQ SDLQ¶ Arbitrarily 
separating out different categories of pains in the latter case risks both researcher 
bias and the very ignorance of difference that the model is intended to avoid. In 
short, distinguishing contextual and unrelated pains, and recognising their 
experienced impact, requires careful, critical, and work-intensive empirical study. 
 Despite these difficulties, however, there are compelling reasons to take at 
least some account of contextual pains: firstly, because of the particular need to 
recognise the impact of external actors upon the experienced pains of punishment; 
and secondly, because of the general inaccessibility of contextual pains to 
sentencing authorities. 
 The role that non-State actors play in criminal justice is inevitably 
FRQWURYHUVLDO7KH6WDWH¶VPRQRSRO\RYHUFULPLQDOMXVWLFHLVDn entrenched political 
value in England and Wales (and in much of the Global West), in part because of 
WKDW V\VWHP¶V emergence as a means of replacement for destabilising private 
revenge. State punishment derives its legitimacy in part from th
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µFLYLOLVHG¶ WKH EUXWDOLW\ RI IHXGDO UHWDOLDWLRQ E\ FKDQQHOOLQJ it through impartial, 
dispassionate institutions (e.g. Beccaria, 1764; Elias, 1994; compare Ignatieff, 
1981). The intrusion of non-State actors is therefore a significant disturbance of the 
6WDWH¶V traditional role in attributing guilt and punishment. 
 Moreover, if the State is not a monopolist of punishment, it cannot 
guarantee that the suffering it imposes is constrained by any principle of 
proportionality, parsimony, or penal minimalism. It is compelled: either to attempt 
to stop third parties from paining the penal subject without explicit State 
permission; or to accept that it plays only a partial role in punishing the individual, 
and mediate its own actions accordingly. All else is a retreat back towards the 
unsatisfyingly shallow accounts of pure objectivism. 
 Even if we might want to achieve something like an abstract liberal vision of 
the punished individual in relation to their punishing society, in which punishment is 
abstract deprivation of political liberty, under the full control of the State (see, e.g., 
Markel and Flanders, 2011), we need to recognise that it does not describe modern 
criminal justice, certainly not in contemporary England and Wales. This is 
SDUWLFXODUO\ WKH FDVH LQ DQ HUD PDUNHG E\ D µGLVSHUVDO RI GLVFLSOLQH¶ LQ ZKLFK
punishment is increasingly inflicted alongside the subject¶VHYHU\GD\OLIHand where 
it therefore interacts with a wide range of social actors who might influence the 
experienced pains of punishment (Cohen, 1985). We must recognise the impact 
that agents beyond the penal State can have upon SXQLVKPHQW¶V subjective 
experience, despite the difficulties, because it is increasingly harder to separate out 
the penal from the wider social experience of the penal subject. If we are to 
meaningfully evaluate punishment, we must confront the institution as it is, and not 
as we would wish it to be (Tonry, 2014). 
 A second reason for taking some account of contextual pains is their very 
inaccessibility to sentencing authorities, and therefore to formal evaluations of 
expected penal severity. By definition, contextual pains are insufficiently 
foreseeable to be accounted for accurately in determining likely penal severity. 
7KH\ FDQQRW EH µREMHFWLYLVHG¶ LQ WKHZD\ WKDW REOLTXH SDLQV FDQ VLQFH LW LV much 
harder to accurately identify the factors that cause them, both in individual cases 
and in general. Thus, a sentencing authority seems compelled either to ignore 
these factors (and the differences in impact they may cause), or to make rough 
estimates of their likely impact, at a cost to legal certainty. 
 However, there is another option: penal policy, informed by social research, 
can take greater account of contextual pains of punishment. Over time, policy-
makers could build up mechanisms for: (a) recognising the factors that affect their 
incidence, such that they can be foreseen as virtual certainties (transforming 
contextual pains into general or specific oblique pains); and (b) reforming 
guidelines for and constraints of judicial decision-making, to recognise patterns in 
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SHQDOVXEMHFWV¶ experiences. Both approaches can play a role in providing a wider 
account of how specific contextual pains affect the experienced severity of the 
SHQDO VXEMHFW¶V sentence, without fully surrendering the ability to separate 
punishment from its surrounding contexts. A proximity-based account of penal 
severity can therefore assist in the development of a more socially accurate 
criminal justice system that is more capable of doing justice in context. 
The proximity model in penal policy and practice 
This overview of the different levels of proximity of the pains of a given punishment 
to the penal State has been necessarily brief. It is not intended as a complete or 
even partial basis for public policy reform, but more as the first step towards 
setting a research (and policy) agenda. However, even this brief sketch enables us 
to identify some implications for criminal justice policy and practice. In this final 
section, I therefore explore different ways in which penal policy-makers and 
sentencing authorities might utilise a proximity model to close the gap between 
what we think we do as punishing communities, and what we actually do. 
 Firstly, however, it is important to think about the different ways that a 
system might approach severity, penal moderation, and the impact of subjective 
experience. In particular, one should avoid confusing normative attempts to 
prescribe how severe a prospective punishment should be with the evaluative, 
retrospective analysis of how severe a particular punishment actually was (compare 
Duff and Green, 2011). At the prescriptive level, where sentencing decision-making 
occurs, any engagement subjective experience must tread a very fine line.  
 Firstly, even allowing for modern improvements of social scienFH¶VUHDFKDQG
scope, one can never predict the subjective experience of an individual subject. The 
experience of any punishment is unique, coloured by the subject¶V FRQWH[W
attitudes, experiences, preconceptions, and surroundings during and after 
punishment, including but by no means limited to the site/s of the punishment/s 
imposed (Liebling, 2004).  
 Secondly, using previous experience to construct guidance for prospective 
judgements about DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V SUHVFULEHG H[SHULHQFH RI penal severity is 
inherently fraught with difficulty. Especially when information about subjective 
experience is almost exclusively acquired through small-scale qualitative social 
research projects (e.g. Durnescu, 2011; Hayes, 2015; Sexton, 2015), there is a 
danger of overgeneralisation. For instance, whilst it might be possible to say that 
the rich suffer a greater reduction of their living standards in comparison to a 
poorer person through imprisonment, it does not follow that all wealthy penal 
subjects are affected equally as badly, or that we can precisely map levels on 
subjective suffering to net income (Beccaria, 1764: 51-52; Kolber, 2009a: 230-
235). If sentencing authorities are to take the subjective experience of punishment 
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into account when calculating penal severity, then they require highly tailored 
guidance that is as accurate as possible about how and to what extent specific 
circumstances are liable to increase or decrease the severity of the sentence. 
 Without wishing to downplay the difficulty of that task, it can at least be 
ameliorated by the evaluative measurement of penal severity. By examining how 
severely punishments have affected the lives of their subjects, one can build up a 
picture which is, if not predictive of future outcomes, at least capable of 
approximating it more closely, increasing the level of fidelity between legal norms 
and social experience. Doing so, however, requires an appreciation of the varying 
ability of different actors to identify pains in practice. 
Who can foresee indirect pains? 
Different State agents will necessarily have access to information about some 
pains, but not others. In particular, contextual pains are defined by the fact that 
they are more-or-less unforeseeable at the point of sentence. Likewise, without 
access to spHFLILFSHQDOVXEMHFWV¶SUH-sentence reports, penal policy-makers (such 
as the Ministry of Justice and Sentencing Council in England and Wales) cannot 
adequately foresee specific oblique pains. An overview of the differentiated 
foreseeability of pains at the sentencing and policy levels is laid out in Table One.  
Table One. Foreseeability of pains at the sentencing and policy levels 
Are pains 
foreseeable« «By sentencing authorities? «By policy-makers? 
Direct pains Yes Yes 
General 
oblique pains 
Potentially (via policy guidance) Potentially (via research) 
Specific 
oblique pains 
Yes (via Pre-Sentence Reports) No 
Contextual 
pains 
No Potentially (via research) 
 Any account of all categories within the proximity model, in other words, 
requires dialogue between the sentencing and policy levels. Several implications 
arise for both sets of decision-makers when using more proximity-based 
conceptions of penal severity. These are discussed below. 
Implications for sentencing practice 
A proximity-based approach to penal severity need not mean any significant 
alteration of the role of the judiciary. After all, subjectivism has always been a 
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(limited) reality of Anglo-Welsh sentencing practice, due to the role played by 
judicial discretion and pre-sentence reports (Nash, 2011). Rather, it would mean 
more formal recognition of the existing role that these subjective factors play, the 
protection of sources of information about them, and a more structured approach to 
ensuring that as full a range of pains as possible can be taken into account. 
 In particular, a proximity model would neither oppose nor support the 
existing Anglo-Welsh practice of using aggravating and mitigating factors in 
Sentencing Council guidelines WR µILQH-WXQH¶ D VHQWHQFH DIWHU JXLOW KDV Eeen 
determined. However, it is important to note that the present use of sentencing 
guidelines, and particularly of personally mitigating circumstances as they currently 
stand (Jacobson and Hough, 2011) can only partially contribute to this process. 
 In fact, the presently recognised range of personally mitigating factors does 
not do much for the intersubjective gauging of penal severity. They provide classes 
of contextual factors, leaving the judge with a wide discretion but little guidance as 
to how much weight to accord to each. This can allow judges to recognise 
subjective differences between subjects (Jacobson and Hough, 2011: 161-162), but 
formal guidance is still restricted to observations about classes of people, which, as 
discussed above, is a crude measure of difference at best. Present systems of 
personal mitigation would at least need to be fine-tuned to deliver proximity-
relevant material, particularly as regards the weighting of individual factors. 
 Moreover, the role of aggravation and mitigation in present sentencing 
guidelines focusses heavily upon criminal acts, rather than FRQYLFWV¶ circumstances. 
Whilst there are many factors that speak to the likely prospective impact of the 
order on the penal subject (and third parties), these must wait until after an initial 
judgment as to the factors that indicate the harm and culpability for the crime 
itself. It is only at this latter point, when the range of potential sentences has been 
more or less decisively laid down (Padfield, 2011), that mitigation or aggravation 
EDVHG RQ WKH SHQDO VXEMHFW¶V FRQWH[WV FDQ WDNH SODFH 7KLV limits the ability of 
personal mitigation to affect overall penal severity, and places more emphasis on 
the role of policy-makers in guiding judgments at the sentencing stage. 
 In short, personal mitigation is not enough by itself to serve as a vehicle for 
proximity-based severity judgments. Courts would need to take a more holistic 
perspective on sentencing, looking at the subject¶Vconduct in comparison with the 
pains that the sentence is likely to inflict on the specific inidivudal in her unique 
contexts, insofar as the court is aware of them. Achieving this would not necessarily 
require new tools, but rather a different approach to how they are used in practice. 
 Although that perceptual shift need not require considerable institutional 
reform, it would nevertheless profoundly affect sentencing practice. In particular, 
one impact of adopting a proximity model of penal severity would be the 
realignment of judicial attitudes towards alternative punishments to imprisonment. 
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When approaching punishment as an abstract liberty deprivation, rather than a 
VHULHV RI VXEMHFWLYH H[SHULHQFHV RU µSDLQV RI SXQLVKPHQW¶ HPSLULFDO HYLGHQFH
suggests that it is easier for judges to aggravate an onerous community penalty 
into a custodial sentence than to mitigate imprisonment into a non-custodial 
sentence (Padfield, 2011; Hough et al., 2003). However, on a pains-based account, 
liberty deprivation is only one potential source of punishment. Community-based 
punishments are not so much less punitive, therefore, but punitive in different 
ways, and suited to different individuals as well as different offences. Recognising 
the pains of all types of punishments, and indeed the pains inherent in criminal 
conviction itself, would provide one route towards improving the perceived 
legitimacy of non-custodial sentences (McNeill, 2011; Robinson et al., 2013). 
 It is important to remember that the capacity of social scientific advances in 
the retrospective recognition of contextual and oblique pains to assist predictive 
sentencing will always, inevitably, be partial. The objective of the proximity model 
at the point of sentence cannot and should not therefore be to set up the judiciary 
as prophets, capable of accurately predicting social experiences. To do so would 
create a judicial interest in monitoring the precise level of pain experienced by the 
penal subjectHQFRXUDJLQJWKH6WDWHWRZDUGVEHKDYLRXU µGDQJHURXVO\DSSURDFKLQJ
VDGLVP¶0DUNHODQd Flanders, 2011: 915). Instead, we should aim to close the gap 
between the predictions of penal severity that objectivised sentencing already 
makes, and the social reality experienced after sentence has been passed. To do 
so, however, requires access to retrospective information unavailable to sentencing 
authorities. The involvement of penal policy-makers would thus be vital, both to 
guide sentencing decisions and to avoid increasingly punitive sentencing practice. 
Implications for penal policy 
Whilst the implications for sentencing practice are confined more to a change of 
perspective than of practices, the transition to a proximity-based account of penal 
severity would imply a more significant shift at the level of penal policy. Since penal 
policy-makers are able to access research findings on general oblique and 
contextual pains that sentencing authorities cannot consider, the proximity model 
would require them to engage with as wide a range of pains as possible, and build 
them into existing laws, guidance, and judicial education in a way that enables 
judges to pre-empt subjective experiences with greater (virtual) certainty. 
 Overall, then, the task for penal policy would be: to reform the law to better 
recognise the impact punishments have when calculating penal severity; to 
commission and engage with research to identify the circumstances in which 
particular pains attend certain penal interventions, so that they can be incorporated 
into judicial decision-making as oblique pains of punishment; and to address the 
influence of external sources of contextual pains in determining penal severity.  
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 This latter task, in particular, is one of deciding which contextual pains are 
unavoidable, and which can be minimised through wider policy interventions. It is 
one of deciding to what extent it is appropriate (and desirable) for communities and 
other external forces to partially determine the experienced severity of punishment. 
Any recognition of punishment as a social phenomenon implies that the State must 
recognise at least some ability of wider social context to affect penal severity, but 
beyond that, the precise level of recognition that contextual pains are an inevitable 
feature of punishment remains debatable.  
 This is, if nothing else, an opportunity for further research and refinement of 
the proximity model, which has, after all, been presented in a very broad-brush, 
abstract manner. Examining which factors affect subjective experience of pains in 
general is a good start, but exploring the structuring impact of factors such as age, 
ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic class will help to refine and clarify how pain is 
currently distributed amongst penal subjects. This will allow us to identify the 
distance between what is and what should be (at the level of policy, but also of 
political ethics) with more precision, providing targets for more specific and wide-
ranging policy (inside and out of the penal State) in future. 
 However, it should be noted that concern with fine-tuning penal severity has 
not been at the top of the recent penal political-economic agenda of England and 
Wales, which has been characterised for much of the last 40 years by D µODZDQG
RUGHU DUPV UDFH¶ (Lacey, 2008: 173-185). The prospects of a proximity model 
actually influencing current penal policy are therefore bleak, and one ought not to 
prematurely assume that the present shift away from explicit punitiveness towards 
managerialism in penal politics will make it any easier to encourage policy 
developments in this direction. 
 Under these conditions, the researcher must be an advocate for policy 
consistent with their work, by contributing to public discourses (and therefore, 
democratic decision-making) through a robust, honest and unbiased account of 
their findings. In other words, the proximity model is not much use unless any 
academic proponents take seriously the public, and inherently political, nature of 
social research in democratic societies (Noaks and Wincup, 2004: 19-35; Loader 
and Sparks, 2011). 
Conclusion: Proximity, Pain, and the Justice of Punishment 
The orthodox definition of punishment is a descriptively unsatisfactory account of 
contemporary sentencing practice, forced by an historical and ongoing dilemma 
between objective clarity and expeditiousness, and subjective detail. It is possible 
to at least partially escape this dilemma by providing for at least some acceptance 
that the severity of a punishment is constituted by its social experience ± that is, by 
the subjective pains it actually engenders.  
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 We can typify the relationship between pains in terms of their proximity to 
the formal State punishment imposed. They may be: pains that are directly 
intended by the sentencing authority; obliquely intended pains arising from either 
the general consequences of conviction or punishment, or the specific known 
circumstances of the penal subject; contextual pains that arise out of the multiple 
contexts of the punishment in question, which react to and intersect with the penal 
intervention; or wholly unrelated pains coincidental to penal processes. All but the 
latter have a part to play in measuring penal severity subjectively. 
 The proximity model is far from a perfect solution to the problem of doing 
just deserts in an unjust world, and whilst it is given here in a relatively broad and 
abstract form. Nevertheless, it provides a way of thinking about measuring penal 
severity that could increase the fidelity between the punishments that the State 
believes itself to be imposing in criminal sentences, and the pains actually 
experienced as a result. Adopting such an approach would improve the accuracy of 
our measurement of penal severity, and so our ability to evaluate the extent to 
which criminal justice is done in practice. However, formal adoption of a proximity-
based approach to sentencing would mean concerted shifts in both sentencing 
practice and penal policy, which will only be practicable through academic 
contribution to public discourse. This, in turn, requires further academic research 
into the precise proximities of the pains of punishment to the imposing State. 
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